As of early July 2026, three significant changes have emerged in Central Asia's key mineral sector: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have begun to integrate exploration, smelting, and deep processing into their integrated industrial plans; the United States has intervened in geological data, investment, logistics, and offtake agreements through the C5+1 mechanism; and Central Asian countries are leveraging competition from the US, China, and Europe to enhance their bargaining power over resources. The current focus of competition lies in controlling exploration data, financing, processing technology, transportation routes, and final sales contracts.
I. Recent Major Developments
(I) Kazakhstan Accelerates the Transformation of Resource Advantages into Processing Capacity
On June 11, Kazakh Prime Minister Bektenov announced at the Astana International Mining and Metallurgical Congress that the Kazakh government will invest approximately $470 million in geological exploration between 2026 and 2028, bringing the detailed geological survey coverage to over 2 million square kilometers. Currently, more than 4.6 million original geological data sets have been digitized, and the next step will be to utilize artificial intelligence to screen prospecting targets. Simultaneously, Abai Oblast is constructing a copper smelter with an investment exceeding $1.5 billion, while Pavlodar Oblast is advancing a hydrometallurgical project with an annual processing capacity of 300,000 tons of gold and copper concentrate. Kazakhstan's industrial policy has shifted from expanding mining to processing concentrates domestically and producing high-value-added metal products.
Foreign investment projects are entering a substantive cooperation phase. A subsidiary of Kazakhstan's national mining company signed a transaction document with Cove Capital, a US-backed firm, planning to build deep-processing facilities based on the North Katpal and Upper Kelakt tungsten mines, with an investment commitment of no less than $1.1 billion. The product will be ammonium paratungstate, and the company intends to enter Western markets through a US government offtake arrangement. The project is expected to create approximately 2,000 jobs.
Rare earth exploration is also accelerating. Cove Kazakhstan's National Geological Company is advancing the Akbulak project in Kostanay Oblast. As of early June, 77 boreholes had been completed, totaling approximately 3,700 meters of drilling, with a planned drilling depth of 9,660 meters for the year. The 380,000 tons of rare earth oxides announced by the company are historical resources from the Soviet era, containing neodymium, praseodymium, and yttrium. These reserves await confirmation through modern drilling, analysis, and independent assessment and cannot be directly considered as recoverable reserves.
II) Uzbekistan is simultaneously expanding tungsten, molybdenum, and uranium resources. At the C5+1 dialogue on June 10, the Uzbek mining sector stated that only about 40% of the country has completed systematic geological surveys. Plans are in place to add 500,000 meters of drilling by 2027 and conduct airborne geophysical surveys covering 60,000 square kilometers. Uzbekistan Technological Metals, established in 2024, manages a portfolio of key mineral projects totaling over $3.5 billion, focusing on building tungsten and molybdenum industrial clusters. Ukraine states that over 100 foreign mining companies operate in the country, with approximately 20 engaged in key mineral projects.
The Engichika tungsten mine is expanding its tailings reprocessing capacity. Ukraine's Technical Metals Company announced in April an $8.5 million investment in the project, planning to increase annual tungsten trioxide concentrate production from 300 tons to 587 tons in 2026 and 1170 tons in 2027; simultaneously processing 1.1 million tons and 1.95 million tons of historical tungsten-containing waste. While the project is relatively small, it reflects Ukraine's development strategy of utilizing Soviet-era tailings to generate cash flow first.
Uranium resource development has entered a new phase. Data updated by the World Nuclear Association in June shows that Navoi Uranium Company has announced JORC standard uranium reserves of 96,600 tons and resources of 53,900 tons; the Kyzylkok mine entered commercial production in April, with a planned annual production of 1200 tons of uranium and a mine life of 15 years. Ukraine is integrating uranium mining, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear engineering talent training into a unified industrial chain, but the conversion, enrichment, and fuel production of uranium products still largely rely on external systems.
(III) Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are beginning to form national resource catalogs.
Kyrgyzstan has approved a national plan for the development of key minerals, identifying 22 priority minerals. As of March, there were 2,014 valid mining licenses nationwide, with 320 to be revoked by 2025. The C5+1 meeting in June revealed that the plan covers four priority projects, five key deposits, and 16 prospective exploration areas, and considers providing tax incentives for exploration companies. Kyrgyzstan's current focus remains on consolidating mining rights, supplementing exploration data, and restoring investor confidence; there is still a significant gap before achieving large-scale processing capacity.
Tajikistan has announced approximately 800 mineral deposits, of which about 100 have been developed, involving antimony, lithium, copper, and rare earth elements. Tajikistan leverages its 98% hydropower share as an advantage in low-carbon smelting and proposes the construction of a regional mineral processing center. According to Oxus Society statistics, Turkmenistan's antimony production accounts for approximately 20% of the world's total, making it a key target for the US and Europe seeking alternative supplies. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, focuses on promoting iodine, bentonite, lithium, boron, and magnesium, and has proposed establishing a Central Asian regional geological data center.
II. The Main Logic Behind the Competition
(I) US Intervention Has Shifted from Diplomatic Initiatives to Projects and Buyouts
The C5+1 Key Minerals Dialogue held on June 10th covered geological exploration, mining, processing, technology transfer, talent training, and logistics. The US is not only concerned with acquiring ore, but also with establishing a complete supply chain that can operate independently of China's processing system. The proposed US government buyout for a tungsten project in Kazakhstan indicates that buyout contracts, policy financing, and project equity are being linked.
However, judging from existing projects, US capital remains highly concentrated in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are mainly at the stage of resource promotion, geological data cooperation, and policy consultation; while Uzbekistan has established project portfolios and tax incentive systems, the number of projects that have truly completed financing closure and entered the construction phase remains limited.
(II) Central Asian countries are unwilling to remain solely at the raw ore export stage. Kazakhstan's construction of copper smelters and tungsten deep-processing facilities, Uzbekistan's expansion of tungsten concentrate production, and Tajikistan's proposal for a regional processing center demonstrate that these countries share a common goal: to transform mineral resources into smelting, materials, and employment benefits. Foreign investment that only seeks mining rights and concentrate exports will find it increasingly difficult to secure policy support; solutions providing technology transfer, local processing, vocational training, and infrastructure are more in line with local government requirements.
(III) China still holds a real advantage in trade and processing. Oxus Society resource tracking data covers 33 key minerals in Central Asia, with annual exports of approximately US$15.7 billion, of which about US$14 billion comes from Kazakhstan, with copper and uranium accounting for US$7.3 billion and US$4.2 billion respectively. China absorbs nearly half of Central Asia's key mineral exports, Russia accounts for about a quarter, the EU for 6.4%, and the US for only 2.1%. The data spans from 2021 to 2025, depending on the type of mineral, but it is sufficient to reflect the existing trade structure: China is the actual buyer and processing hub, while the US and Europe currently mainly possess influence through policy funding, technical standards, and new projects.
III. Impact Assessment
(I) Kazakhstan will become the country with the most concentrated competition from the US, China, and Europe. Kazakhstan possesses resources in uranium, copper, chromium, manganese, tungsten, titanium, beryllium, and rare earth elements. Its mining infrastructure, railway transportation, and international financing conditions are also significantly better than other Central Asian countries. In the next two to three years, new competition will focus on tungsten, rare earth, and copper deep processing projects, rather than traditional uranium mining production, which has already established a stable pattern.
(II) Uzbekistan has the conditions to catch up, but commercialization remains constrained. Uzbekistan has a variety of resources, a relatively fast pace of market reform, and a large population and industrial system. The constraints are insufficient modern geological data, uneven distribution of hydropower and transportation conditions in mining areas, and a strong administrative influence on investment approvals. The $3.5 billion project portfolio proposed by Uzbekistan is a reserve project scale and does not equate to actual investment. Subsequent assessments should use financing agreements, feasibility studies, mining rights acquisition, and equipment procurement as criteria for project implementation.
(III) Mineral Development Will Be Tied to Transportation Corridors
While the volume of critical mineral transportation is lower than that of coal and common metal ores, its value is high, and compliance and safety requirements are stringent. Western capital demands the construction of supply chains that bypass Russia and reduce reliance on Chinese processing, while Central Asian countries need to leverage the Trans-Caspian Corridor, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and the existing China-Kazakhstan corridor to reduce transportation costs. Competition for mining rights will further extend to railway nodes, dry ports, warehousing, customs certification, and product traceability systems.
(IV) Environmental and Community Issues Will Become Thresholds for Project Implementation
An OECD report in March pointed out that mining investment in Central Asia remains constrained by factors such as outdated geological data, insufficient regulatory transparency, a high proportion of state-owned enterprises, and weak labor rights and environmental risk management. Kyrgyzstan's uranium project has sparked social controversy, and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan still have issues with tailings management from the Soviet era. With the introduction of international financing, environmental impact assessments, tailings safety, water use, and community consultations will directly affect loans and offtake agreements. IV. Trend Assessment
First, competition for key minerals in Central Asia has entered an integrated stage encompassing resources, processing, logistics, and government buyouts. Simply possessing mining rights without processing technology and sales channels makes it difficult to establish stable control.
Second, while the US and Europe cannot replace China's position in regional trade and smelting systems in the short term, they are vying for new projects through policy financing, geological data, technical standards, and government buyouts. The focus of competition is future incremental growth, not existing production.
Third, Central Asian countries will continue to attract investment from various sources and will not easily accept exclusive bloc arrangements. Local governments will leverage competition from the US, China, and Europe to improve tax revenue, local processing, and technology transfer conditions.
Reprinted from UZB News